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The pharmaceutical industry represents one of the most complex, most valuable and most important 
industries in the world, as it generates revenue from the most valuable asset of humanity, namely 
human health and therefore also human life. However, human health is also a right which the 
Constitution of the World Health Organization (WHO) legally obliges all states parties to declare 
in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations that “the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being…”. Furthermore, the 
WHO states that it is a state’s legal obligation “to ensure access to timely, acceptable and affordable 
health care of appropriate quality”, consequently the role and objective of most governments is 
predetermined and can thereby exert direct impact and bargaining power on the pharmaceutical 
industry along with its multinational corporations (World Health Organization 2017). This 
particular dynamic between governments and companies within the pharmaceutical sector 
demonstrates the relevance of scientific, research-based contribution to the analysis of business-
government relationships (hereafter referred to as BGR) in the pharmaceutical industry. The term 
of International Business-Government Relationships (IBGR) amongst the associated opportunities, 
potential benefits, risks and costs for companies as well as governments have already been 
comprehensively analyzed and described in literature. Boddewyn  (2016) points out that sovereign 
agents, public policies and actions affect multinational enterprises (MNE) as well as negotiations 
that are crucial for accomplishing “order in a relation in which potential conflict threatens to undo 
or upset opportunities to realize mutual gains” (Williamson 1996). Correspondingly, it is important 
to examine how multinational companies can shape the outcomes of the relationship between the 
government and the company itself. A further limitation with regard to emerging markets enables 
an in-depth analysis of the research question and takes into account the increasing significance of 
emerging markets within the pharmaceutical industry. Gautam and Pan (2016) outline that 
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emerging market growth is a key revenue contributor to global pharmaceutical sales, amounting to 
$1.25 trillion in 2019, as they “account for almost one-quarter-to-one-half of the revenues for big 
pharma” (Statista 2020a). Moreover, global pharmaceutical markets face major discontinuities, 
partly because growth in developed markets will diminish while emerging markets gain growth 
and thus importance (McKinsey&Company 2020; Gautam and Pan 2016).  
In order to examine the impact of MNEs on outcomes of business-government relations within the 
pharmaceutical industry, a case study about the pricing of the Swiss multinational corporation 
Novartis’ former blockbuster drug Glivec in Colombia and India, is conducted. According to 
several institutions such as Morgan Stanley Capital International, Standard & Poor’s and the 
Financial Times, Colombia and India are both rated as emerging markets (FTSE 2020; S&P Global 
2020; MSCI 2020). The subsequent analysis of the outcomes of Novartis government relationship 
in both emerging markets contributes to the case study methodology and is built upon the 
stakeholder theory, the institutional theory, business-government bargaining and further 
negotiation principles (Meyer and Peng 2016; Williamson 1996; Boddewyn 2016; Peng et al. 2008; 
Miles 2017). Secondary research is used to provide an overview of the company, its drug Glivec, 
the business environment and the government’s framework conditions, in terms of the 
pharmaceutical market, the health system, health expenditure and funding in both countries. The 
description of both cases, Colombia vs. Novartis as well as India vs. Novartis, is primarily based 
on newspaper articles, business and pharma magazines but also includes articles of journals and 
non-profit organizations. In the face of current events, BGRs can be of major importance as 
governments around the world compete for the Covid-19 vaccine. Additionally, all stakeholders – 
government, healthcare companies and payers – are challenged to ensure sustainable access to 
healthcare, especially in emerging markets where pricing is a key challenge (Gautam and Pan 
2016). Given the aforementioned factors concerning relevance and actuality, the objective of this 
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work project is firstly to analyze the BGR of Novartis and the Colombian as well as Indian 
government respectively, secondly to examine Novartis’ impact on the outcomes and its 
implications in both cases and thirdly, to provide some guidance for Novartis and other 
multinational pharmaceutical corporations in regard to negotiation approaches and IBGR in 
emerging markets, based on the case study.  
 
2. About Novartis  
Novartis is a Swiss multinational pharmaceutical company with headquarters in Basel and was 
created in 1996, as a result of a merger between Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz, two chemical and 
pharmaceutical companies from Basel, whereas the roots of Novartis and its predecessor 
companies date back more than 250 years. The corporation sells its products in approximately 155 
countries around the world, reaching 799 million patients worldwide in 2019, a slight increase 
compared to the previous year when 765 million patients were reached. Furthermore, Novartis 
ranks as third biggest pharmaceutical company in the world in 2020, measured by its revenue of 
$47.4 billion and a net income of $11.7 billion in 2019 (Novartis Website 2020; Haqqi 2020). In 
the same year, Novartis employed 103,914 full-time employees, distributed over the two global 
operating divisions Innovative Medicines and Sandoz as well as the three cross-divisional 
organizational units: the Novartis Institutes for BioMedical Research, Global Drug Development, 
Novartis Technical Operations and Novartis Business Services (Statista 2020b). The Innovative 
Medicines Division is a global leader in providing patent-protected medicines to patients as well 
as physicians and entails research, development, manufacturing, distribution and sale of patented 
prescription medicines. It is organized into the two global business units Novartis Pharmaceuticals 
and Novartis Oncology. The Sandoz Division is the second largest manufacturer of generics in the 
world, dedicated to the development, manufacturing, distribution and sale of prescription 
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medicines along with pharmaceutical active substances which are not secured by valid and 
enforceable patents of third parties (Ecks 2008). Retail Generics, Anti Infectives and 
Biopharmaceuticals are the three franchises in which Sandoz is organized on a global scale. (Ecks 
2008; Novartis Website 2020) 
2.1 Glivec 
Novartis’ cancer drug Glivec (imatinib mesylate/imatinib) is an oral kinase inhibitor, used to treat 
Chronic Myeloid Leukemia (CML) and Gastrointestinal Stromal Tumours (GIST) among other 
rare cancers. The medicine does not permanently cure cancer, it only slows the disease progression 
which means the duration of the treatment is lifelong, whereas the life expectancy of a patient 
without the supply of the drug is utterly short. Glivec is approved in more than 116 countries across 
the world, nonetheless the company holds patents in only 35 countries worldwide. Patents for the 
predecessor of the current Glivec version were filed worldwide for the first time by Novartis in 
1993, excluding India since patent protection was not offered in India at that time. (Glivec Website 
2020; Gabble and Kohler 2014) In 2015, the active ingredient imatinib was added to the World 
Health Organization’s (WHO) List of Essential Medicines under the complementary list that 
“presents essential medicines for priority diseases…” (World Health Organization 2019). The 
WHO declares essential medicines by considering public health relevance, evidence on efficacy 
and safety as well as comparative cost-effectiveness. In addition to that, essential medicines “are 
intended to be available with the context of functioning health systems at all times in adequate 
amounts, in the appropriate dosage forms, with assured quality and adequate information, and at a 
price the individual and the community can afford” (WHO Website 2020). 
As stated in Novartis’ 2019 Annual Report, Glivec belongs to the Novartis Oncology business unit 
which is part of the company’s Innovative Medicines division. Besides that, the drug belongs to 
the “Top 20 Innovative Medicines” of the company. In 2019, the Innovative Medicines division 
 7 
accounted for $37.7 billion in net sales, an increase of 8% compared to the previous year, whereas 
Novartis Oncology delivered net sales of $14.4 billion with an increase of 7% and Glivec alone 
accounted for $1.3 billion in net sales with a decrease of 19% in comparison to 2018. This decline 
is mainly driven by generic competition in most major markets which resulted in the drug losing 
its top-seller status over the last years. In fact, Glivec used to be the company’s blockbuster drug 
for several years until it lost the exclusivity for patented products in 2016, nevertheless it is listed 
under “Novartis’ top 10 drugs based on revenue” in 2019 (Statista 2020c). Among Novartis 
oncology products, Glivec is still one of the strongest turnover contributors, thus belongs to the 
corporation’s key marketed products in oncology. The net sales of Novartis’ Innovative Medicines 
Division are distributed to the four sales regions in 2019 as follows (Appendix 1): The US is the 
largest market with a net sales volume of $13.8 billion, an 16% increase compared to the previous 
year. Europe net sales amounted to 12.9 billion and increased by 4%, however it used to be 
Novartis’ largest market within the Innovative Medicines Division until 2019 and still is in terms 
of Group net sales. Asia, Africa and Australasia share net sales of $8.5 billion, an increase of 4% 
and lastly, Canada and Latin America’s net sales sum up to $2.7 million, an increase of only 1%. 
Net sales of the “Emerging Growth Markets”, which are all markets except of the established 
markets USA, Western Europe, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, increased by 6% in 
2019, primarily attributable to double-digit growth in China. (Novartis Annual Report 2020; 
Novartis Website 2020) 
 
3. Colombia vs. Novartis Case  
In 2012, Novartis’ cancer drug Glivec received a patent in Colombia which was due to expire in 
mid-2018. A previous patent application for the drug in Colombia was rejected in 2003, resulting 
in the production of 197 percent cheaper generics than Novartis’ Glivec as reported by the health 
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ministry. In the beginning of 2016, the Columbian government requested from Novartis to lower 
the price of the drug’s active ingredient Imatinib that is used to treat leukemia and other cancers. 
The aim of this price reduction is to support the overburdened healthcare system in Colombia. 
However, initial price negotiations between Novartis and Colombia, including the Minister of 
Health and Social Protection Alejandro Gaviria have not been successful, whereupon the country 
stated that it may advocate a compulsory license, nevertheless further negotiations were still 
possible at this point. Consequently, competitors such as generic companies would be allowed to 
produce and sell lower-cost versions of Glivec while Novartis would lose its patent-secured 
monopoly position in the Colombian pharmaceutical market. In April 2016, the price of a 400 
milligram imatinib tablet amounted to approximately $43 and around 2,500 patients in Colombia 
were treated using imatinib. The government proposed a price reduction to Novartis of $18.50 per 
400 milligram tablet which was rejected by the company. According to Gaviria, Novartis didn’t 
want “to negotiate under the threat of compulsory licensing” (Symmes Cobb and Acosta 2016a). 
(Reuters 2016; Bruns 2016; Symmes Cobb and Acosta 2016b) 
Other countries such as India, Brazil and Thailand have been strongly criticized by pharmaceutical 
companies and the U.S. government for enforcing compulsory licensing which could infringe 
patent law. The Glivec case in India will be described afterwards. In Washington, Colombian 
diplomats were worried about possible political and economic consequences from the U.S. 
regarding compulsory licensing, namely reductions in proposed funding for the Peace-Colombia 
aid package, worth $450 million with the prerequisite of an end to the long-lasting conflict with 
the Marxist rebels. The news agency Reuters has been informed by Novartis that it has been 
actively seeking a resolution at that time, otherwise Colombia might face a compensation payment 
in favor of Novartis. After renewed negotiations lasting two weeks, Colombia and the 
pharmaceutical company could not reach an agreement in terms of price conditions. (Symmes Cobb 
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and Acosta 2016a; 2016b; Reuters 2016; Bruns 2016) Besides that, misunderstandings and 
differences of perception marked the ambiguity about the conclusion of negotiations, especially 
from Novartis’ perspective. As negotiations broke down, Columbian authorities decided to set the 
new price of Glivec unilaterally using a public interest declaration. This allows health regulators 
and experts to inspect the case and set a lower price at which Novartis is legally required to sell the 
drug. The company stated that they “have remained fully committed to finding a resolution that 
benefits patients, innovators and the Colombian healthcare system” (Symmes Cobb and Acosta 
2016a). Furthermore, compulsory license and declarations of public interest “can be important and 
legitimate tools to be used only in exceptional circumstances…”, however circumstances in the 
Colombian healthcare system could not be classified as exceptional according to Novartis (Bruns 
2016). Another argument of the company addresses that other non-infringing generic versions of 
imatinib are available on the market and could be purchased by the government in order to reduce 
its healthcare budget. In addition to that, there is no Glivec shortage or any other indication in terms 
of Glivec access issues in Colombia. Novartis calls attention to the usage of these tools in price 
negotiations which “would create a damaging precedent that could apply to all patent-covered 
innovations – pharmaceutical or otherwise” while receiving approval from other pharmaceutical 
organizations. (Bruns 2016; Symmes Cobb and Acosta 2016b)  
Approximately one year later, on April 12, 2017, the Business & Human Rights Resource Center 
reported about leaked documents written by Novartis to the Ministry of Trade which reveal the 
corporation’s willingness or threat to involve an international investment arbitration court “for an 
alleged violation of the bilateral investment agreement between Switzerland and Colombia (BIT)” 
(Business & Human Rights Resource Centre 2017). Based on a provision in Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, named Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), Novartis as an investor in Colombia is 
legally entitled to bring a case against Colombia to a private international arbitration tribunal 
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instead of involving local courts first. The extend of the documents impact is difficult to analyze 
and evaluate, nonetheless the Columbian health authorities did not continue their efforts to obtain 
compulsory licensing shortly after Novartis notification and only focused on reducing the price of 
Glivec through declaring public interest. (Miller 2015; Business & Human Rights Resource Centre 
2017) Finally on December 20, 2016, the Colombian government lowered the price of Glivec by 
44 percent. The new price of each 400 milligram tablet of the cancer drug costs $27.6 compared to 
the original price of $49 (Reuters 2016).  
 
4. India vs. Novartis Case 
The Novartis Glivec case in India dates to 1997, when the company introduced a new formula of 
the imatinib drug to the market which claims 30% more bioavailability than the previous version, 
meaning that the absorption in the bloodstream increases by 30%. Hence, the company applied for 
a patent that was filed under the India’s “mailbox” provisions and enabled patent applications of 
companies while the Indian government transformed into a revised intellectual property legal 
system by order of the World Trade Organization (WTO) until 2005. At the same time, generic 
manufacturers were producing and selling Glivec in India at less than 10% of the patented version’s 
price, forcing Novartis to influence the Indian government to take a stance on the protection of 
intellectual property rights. Therefore, Novartis was granted Exclusive Marketing Rights (EMR) 
by the Indian government in 2003 until the patent application for Glivec was subject for review. 
These EMR halted most of the generic version production, leading to extensive access barriers for 
patients needing affordable cancer treatment. An objection against Novartis’ patent application, 
including its examination in 2005, was filed by various generic manufacturers as well as non-profit 
organizations such as the Cancer Patients Aid Association (CPAA). There were also protests 
against the company’s EMR status in India at the same time. (Gabble and Kohler 2014) In January 
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2006, the Indian Patent Office rejected Novartis’ patent application for Glivec under Section 3(d) 
of the Indian Patents Act, on the grounds that it “did not demonstrate any significant changes in 
therapeutic effectiveness over its pre-existing form, which was already patented outside India”  
(Gabble and Kohler 2014). Section 3(d) in the Indian Patents Act aims at preventing 
“evergreening”, a procedure in which companies obtain new patents based on only minor 
modifications compared to existing drugs (BBC 2013). Precisely, it states that reformulations of 
already existing medicines must indicate “significantly enhanced efficacy” in comparison to the 
previous version of the drug to be eligible for extended patents (Chandra 2011). However, the 
meaning or extent of the word “efficacy” is not further defined, neither in the Indian Patents Act 
nor in its implementing rules. As a result, the interpretation of “efficacy” is critical to this case. 
Despite this, Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act was mainly included to protect public health 
interests. (Gabble and Kohler 2014) 
In response, two lawsuits against the Indian government were filed by Novartis in May 2006, one 
against the rejection of its patent application and the second against Section 3(d) on the basis that 
it was incompatible with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS), ratified by India in 1994. The Madras High Court decided against the company’s attempt 
to overturn Section 3(d) in August 2007, followed by the dismissal of Novartis’ appeal against the 
rejection of its patent application, resolved by the Indian Intellectual Property Appellate Board in 
2009. Subsequently in the same year, the corporation filed a new case in the Indian Supreme Court 
claiming the base of these decisions. In early April 2013, the Indian Supreme Court’s final decision 
led to the rejection of Novartis’ patent case while the chances of a precent being set are high and 
so are the risks involved. (Gabble and Kohler 2014) According to BBC (2013), the monthly 
treatment costs of Glivec in India amounted to approximately $2,600, whereas the monthly 
treatment costs of the generic equivalent amounted to approximately $175. The company 
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announced that the Supreme Court’s decision “discourages future innovation in India” and the 
former vice-chairman as well as managing director of Novartis India, Ranjit Shahani, added “this 
[ruling] is a setback for patients that will hinder medical progress for diseases without effective 
treatment options” (BBC 2013). Under Novartis’ view, Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act was 
not applicable to Glivec in the first place. The corporation claimed that the initial patented version 
of the imatinib drug, served as only the first development step of the current formula and could not 
be dispensed to patients. Novartis also challenged the validity of this Section 3(d) under the TRIPS 
Agreement and argued that India’s vague patent laws can result in stifling innovation within the 
pharmaceutical industry. A further argument of Novartis and other pharmaceutical companies 
points out that research and development processes take a long time and demand huge investment 
costs in the pharmaceutical industry, implying the importance of a solid system protecting 
intellectual property rights and enabling companies to compensate for these expenses. (Gabble and 
Kohler 2014)  
To analyze the impact of BGRs in the case of India vs. Novartis, it is essential to consider the 
Indian government’s perspective as well. The objective of certain provisions in India’s patent laws, 
as Section 3(d), constitutes the protection of the population’s access to medicines (Médecins Sans 
Frontières 2005). Moreover, the monthly treatment costs of the patented Glivec version exceeds 
three times the average annual income in India, thus the pricing of the cancer treatment represented 
probably the most significant factor of the Indian government’s position on Novartis’s Glivec case. 
Therefore, the Indian government’s interpretation of international intellectual property protection 
laws was adapted to India’s public health needs, namely about 300,000 patients who used the drug 
in 2013. (Gabble and Kohler 2014) Lastly, the patent rejection decision has “global significance 
since India’s generic drug industry, pegged to be valued at $26 billion, supplies much of the cheap 
medicine used in the developing world” (The Associated Press 2013). 
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5. Colombia’s Pharmaceutical Market 
An overview of the Colombian pharmaceutical market is essential in order to analyze the BGR 
between Novartis and the Colombian government on the basis of the Glivec case. In terms of 
market size, Colombia’s pharmaceutical market was valued at $4.795 billion in 2019 and continues 
to grow by 3% until 2022, as forecasts indicate. This is in line with the development of Colombia 
towards becoming an export hub for pharmaceutical products, an opportunity which Novartis and 
other multinational pharmaceutical corporations like Abbott, Pfizer, Fresenius Medical Care and 
Sanofi have already identified. These multinational companies amongst others account for more 
than 25% of Colombia’s pharmaceutical sector exports amounting to $358.4 million, a volume of 
58,000 tons in 2019 along with a 10.8% growth compared to the previous year. In addition to that, 
Colombia is known for its strong clinical research environment, namely 121 research centers in 
accordance with the Colombian Association of Clinical Research Centers. In fact, the country has 
been chosen by major pharmaceutical companies as a clinical research location for studies in regard 
to the COVID-19 pandemic due to the quality of clinical research centers as well as Colombia’s 
demographic diversity. (Invest in Colombia 2020)  
From an investment perspective, Colombia’s pharmaceutical market entails great potential because 
of its sustained market growth from 2014 to 2017, when sales grew at an annual average growth 
rate (CAGR) of 5.3%, based on local currency (COP). Dynamic growth covers the following 
segments of this market with their respective CAGR’s in Colombia between 2014 and 2017: 
Generics with 4.9%, over-the-counter (OTC) products with 4.8% and patented medicines with 
5.9%. Bogota serves as a hub for its pharmaceutical market, accounting for 49% jobs in this sector, 
47% of exports and 82% of imports. Also, 66% of manufacturers and 65% of wholesalers are 
located in the country’s capital as well as Novartis. Besides that, the city supports an agenda 
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towards progressive pharmaceuticals and health services, attracting investments of international 
corporations. In the area of pharmaceutical products regulation, Colombia is recognized as a global 
forerunner, supported by its international reference entity, the National Institute of Surveillance of 
Medicines and Drugs (INVIMA) which is highly accredited by the Panamerican Health 
Organization. (Invest In Bogotá 2020) In 2013, a report about Novartis global company profile in 
consumer health, published by Euromonitor International (Passport), indicated that Latin America 
belongs to the regions with the greatest growth potential, therefore expanding to emerging markets 
within Latin America was predicted to be one of the company’s strategic priorities (Euromonitor 
International 2013).  
5.1 Health System 
Colombia’s health system consists of a private sector and social security sector. The General Social 
Security Health System, named Sistema General de Seguridad Social en Salud (SGSSS) in Spanish, 
was introduced by the Colombian government in 1993 and provides health care to about 97.6% of 
the country’s population today. The enrollment in the SGSSS is mandatory, whether it is within 
the private or social security sector which comprises the three following plans. The contributory 
plan of the SGSSS covers independent works, salaried workers and pensioners while the subsidized 
plan covers anybody who is in need. A third plan covers about 5.4%, namely employees from 
particular institutions. (Pan American Health Organization 2020) 
However, it is also important to mention that the pharmaceutical market in Colombia is exposed to 
corruption, as the country is currently ranked 96th out of 180 countries conforming to the 
Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International (Transparency International 2019). 
Regarding the pharmaceutical market, corruption is a major impediment to improving access to 
quality medicines and enhancing the healthcare system. That’s why the WHO started the initiative 
“Good Governance for Medicines (GGM) in 2004 in an effort to address this complex and versatile 
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challenge by precisely addressing the importance of transparency to prevent corruption in the 
health sector. The GGM programme consists of a 3-step model implementation being adapted to 
the country context through firstly assessing the transparency within the pharmaceutical sector and 
secondly developing a national GGM framework which determines the legal and political structure 
as well as the basis for the legal binding implementation. The third phase is about implementing 
and translating the developed GGM framework into practice by fully integrating it within the 
Ministries of Health (MOH). Colombia is among the 37 countries participating in the country 
specific framework development and implementation of the GMM programme at different stages. 
(Baghdadi-Sabeti and Serhan 2010)  
5.2 Health Expenditure and Funding 
According to the “Health at a Glance 2019” report, published by the Organisation of Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), the following data about Colombia’s health expenditure 
and funding is provided. Colombia’s health expenditure per capita in 2018 is ranked fourth last 
amongst 44 countries and accounted for $960 while the average of OECD countries accounted for 
$3,994 (Appendix 2). The country’s health expenditure measured as percentage share of GDP 
amounted to 7.2% in 2018. In comparison, the OECD countries average amounted to 8.8% 
(Appendix 3). The funding of health care through different finance schemes comes usually from 
various sources, however government schemes are primarily financed by general revenues, mainly 
taxes being allocated to the different levels of government through a budgetary process. 
Nevertheless, other schemes as social health insurance in which particular population groups are 
dependent on financial support in terms of insurance contributions as well as general budget 
support for the insurance fund, can also benefit from contributions of governments. The private 
health insurance scheme consists of individuals who pay regular premiums into a fund in order to 
get their medical care paid. Depending on the country and health system, government’s subsidies 
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or employers may contribute to a proportion of the premium. Factors like the type of health system, 
government policy and composition of the population determine the degree of public funding of 
health. In 2017, Colombia’s health expenditure was funded proportionally through the following 
types of financing: 68% by compulsory health insurance, 16% by out-of-pocket, 10% by voluntary 
health insurance and 6% by the government scheme. The compulsory health insurance proportion 
is well above the OECD countries average of 37% whilst the out-of-pocket proportion is less 
compared to the OECD countries average of 21% (Appendix 4). In terms of public funding, 
Colombia’s health expenditure from public sources, measured as a percentage share of total health 
expenditure, amounted to 68% in 2017 which is close to the OECD countries average of 71% 
(Appendix 5). (OECD 2019)  
As displayed in the OECD’s “Health at Glance: Latin America and the Caribbean 2020” report, 
one of the biggest drivers of health expenditure in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) is the 
pharmaceutical sector, where medicines constitute a substantial financial burden for not only 
governments but also for people. This contributes to policy concerns, however there is an 
opportunity of increasing efficiency in pharmaceutical spending, namely the development of the 
generic market. Colombia belongs to the countries in LAC in which health expenditure has grown 
more rapidly than income (Appendix 6). Moreover, the main funding source of Colombia’s overall 
health expenditure was the government’s health expenditure with a share of 73.5%, very close to 
the OECD country’s average of 73.6% in 2017, with a slight increase since 2010 (Appendix 7). 
The type of healthcare system, the political priority of the health sector and the fiscal scope of a 
government represent several factors that influence the amount of public funding allocated to 
health. There are other governmental public services competing against healthcare, such as 
housing, education and defense which the government’s funding is responsible for as well. Due to 
the economic situation and political decision-making, healthcare budgets may change from year to 
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year. In 2017, Colombia’s general government health expenditure accounted for a share of 13.4% 
of total government expenditure, decreasing since 2010, whereas the average of OECD country’s 
accounted for 24.5% (Appendix 8). (OECD; The World Bank 2020) The comparison between 
Colombia and the average of OECD countries will be used to demonstrate the emerging market 
aspect linked to the country’s pharmaceutical market, as OECD member countries mainly reveal 
high-income and most of them are classified as developed markets. Since 2020, Colombia belongs 
to the exceptional member countries due to its emerging market classification.  
 
6. India’s Pharmaceutical Market 
As the second case study about Novartis and its cancer drug Glivec takes place in India, it is also 
important to provide an overview of India’s pharmaceutical market to be able to analyze as well as 
compare these two cases and to identify similarities and differences that could have an impact on 
the BGRs within both cases. India’s (National Investment Promotion & Facilitation Agency 2020a) 
provides the following information about its pharmaceutical market which represents the third 
biggest pharmaceutical market worldwide in terms of production volume, accounting for 10% of 
the global industry and the 14th biggest in terms of value. As the world’s largest provider of 
generics, holding a share of 20% in global supply volume, and the largest vaccine producer 
worldwide, supplying 62% of global vaccine demand, the market size of India’s pharmaceutical 
industry amounts to $36 billion in 2020. Thereof, generics account for a 70% revenue share and 
patented drugs for a 21% revenue share. Exports of India’s pharmaceutical market were $19.3 
billion between 2018 and 2019 with a year-to-year growth rate of 10.72%. The market is expected 
to grow to $100 billion by 2025 along with its strong network of 3,000 pharmaceutical 
manufacturers as well as approximately 10,500 manufacturing facilities and a current growth rate 
between 7% and 8%. Within the last two decades, foreign direct investments (FDI) in the 
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pharmaceutical sector steadily increased to a cumulative worth of $16.54 billion between April 
2000 and June 2020, including major investments from multinational pharmaceutical corporations 
such as Novartis, Pfizer, GlaxoSmithKline and Johnson&Johnson. This trend has been promoted 
and accelerated by government policies, namely concerning FDI as well as India’s Pharma Vision 
2020. In regard to the FDI policies, the Indian government allows 100% FDI for greenfield 
pharmaceuticals under the automatic route which means that foreign investors or Indian companies 
do not require any government approval for the investment. When it comes to brownfield 
investments in the pharmaceutical industry, the Indian government allows 74% withing the 
automatic route and 26% through the government route. The government route requires approval 
from the Indian government prior to the investment through FDI proposals that are examined by 
the respective Ministry. The “Pharma Vision 2020” was launched by the Indian government’s 
Department of Pharmaceuticals with the objective to make the country a global leader in end-to-
end pharmaceutical production while creating substantial value for its economy. (India Brand 
Equity Foundation 2020)  
The “Pharmaceuticals” report of India’s National Investment Promotion & Facilitation Agency 
subdivides the growth drivers of the pharmaceutical market in several demand-side and supply-
side factors. The demand-side factors are Accessibility, Affordability, Epidemiological Factors and 
Medical Tourism. The accessibility of medical products and services remains a barrier in India, 
especially for the patients living in rural areas, therefore an investment over $200 billion in medical 
infrastructure will be carried out over the next decade contributing to market growth. As regards to 
the growth driver affordability, around 73 million households are expected to shift to the middle 
class within the next 10 years. Additionally, the Ayushman Bharat National Health Protection 
Scheme (NHPS) as well as the Pradhan Mantri Bhartiya Janaushadhi Pariyojana (PMBJP) scheme 
fund and work on the availability of affordable medicines respectively, both will be discussed in 
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more detail in the following section about India’s health system. Epidemiological Factors include 
a patient pool that is expected to rise over 20% within the next decade due to population growth, 
lifestyle changes and new diseases boosting demand for medication. Lastly, India’s Medical 
Tourism industry forecasts a growth of $13.3 billion until 2022. The supply-side factors also 
promote growth in India’s pharmaceutical industry and comprise Patented Drugs, Medical 
Infrastructure, Cost Efficiency as well as Talent Pool. Patents for branded generics account for 
cumulative global sales of over $251 billion and are expected to expire until 2024. This progression 
contributes to further fostering India’s pharmaceutical market, holding great potential especially 
for the country’s generics market. Besides the already mentioned infrastructure investments by the 
government, pharmaceutical corporations have increased spending to penetrate the rural markets 
in India as well. In terms of cost efficiency, India’s production costs are almost 33% lower 
compared to the US whilst labour costs are between 50% and 55% lower compared to western 
countries. In addition to that, India’s talent pool of pharma and biotech professionals is the second 
largest worldwide, right after China. (National Investment Promotion & Facilitation Agency 
2020b) All in all, both supply-side as well as demand-side factors not only create opportunities for 
domestic companies but also attract multinational foreign companies to India’s pharmaceutical 
sector.  
6.1 Health System  
According to (Chokshi et al. 2016), India’s health system constitutes of public and private 
healthcare service providers with most of the latter being concentrated in urban regions, providing 
secondary and tertiary healthcare services whereas public healthcare services are mainly 
concentrated in rural areas and are based on a three-tier system depending on population norms. 
Since India has a federal system of government, governance, funding and operations of its 
healthcare system is split between the federal and state governments. The three-tier system consists 
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of primary healthcare encompassing essential medical services, secondary healthcare which is 
comprised of medical specialists and tertiary healthcare covering hospitals as well as specialty care. 
Being built upon the Report on the Health Survey and Development Committee from 1946, it 
provides preventive and curative health care with the goal of ensuring access to primary care 
independent of individual socioeconomic conditions. Nonetheless, the deficiencies of the public 
healthcare system in accessibility and affordability have contributed to the concurrent development 
of the private healthcare system and its services. (Chokshi et al. 2016) This results in the large 
share of out-of-pocket health expenditure which goes hand in hand with the government’s overall 
significantly low spending on healthcare, as described in the section health expenditure and 
funding.  
However, there has been a change over the last decade towards an increase of the government’s 
healthcare budget and several government initiatives promoting accessibility and affordability for 
especially the poor and vulnerably populations in India. One of the more recent initiatives is the 
Ayushman Bharat scheme, also known as Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana (PM-JAY), which 
was approved by the central government in March 2018 and has been recognized around the world 
as an important step for India to achieve universal healthcare coverage. The scheme’s main 
objective is offering hospital coverage to the country’s poor or low-income population, accounting 
for 40% in India. The PM-JAY is part of the NHPS that serves individuals in the bottom two 
income quintiles. (Tikkanen et al. 2020) As stated by India’s National Investment Promotion & 
Facilitation Agency, the NHPS is projected to benefit 100 million poor and vulnerable families 
with a secondary and tertiary healthcare cover of approximately up to $6,900 per family per year. 
Thereby, it is regarded as the largest healthcare program in the world, funded by the government. 
Another initiative was lunched by the Department of Pharmaceuticals, Ministry of Chemicals and 
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the Indian government in 2008, the Pradhan Mantri Bhartiya Janaushadhi Pariyojana (PMBJP) 
scheme with the objective of providing quality generics at affordable prices (Department of 
Pharmaceuticals 2020). This has resulted in savings between 50% and 90% for the Indian 
population and enhanced the ease of availability of generic drugs via the nationwide PMBJP 
Kendras (National Investment Promotion & Facilitation Agency 2020b). Both initiatives may need 
to be considered by multinational pharmaceutical corporations like Novartis when doing business 
in India, in order to understand the overall dynamics of India’s healthcare system among with its 
opportunities and challenges directly linked to the country’s pharmaceutical market.  
6.2 Health Expenditure and Funding 
Conforming to the OECD’s “Health at a Glance 2019” report, India’s health expenditure per capita 
is ranked last, amounting to $209 in 2018 (Appendix 2). In the same year, India’s health 
expenditure as a share of GDP was 3.6%, thus the country with the second lowest share, just behind 
Indonesia (Appendix 3). In 2017, India’s health expenditure was financed proportionally as 
follows: 65% out-of-pocket, 22% by the government scheme, 3% by compulsory health insurance, 
2% by voluntary health insurance and 8% by other finance schemes. The out-of-pocket proportion 
is by far the largest amongst all 44 countries, also compared to the OECD country’s average of 
21% (Appendix 4). India’s health expenditure funded by public sources, measured as a share of 
total health expenditure, amounted to 26% (Appendix 5). As a result, India is the country with the 
lowest proportion of public funding sources in terms of total health expenditure and far behind the 
OECD countries average of 71%. The “Health at a Glance: Asia/ Pacific 2020” report of the OECD 
and WHO indicates that health spending growth has surpassed economic growth in many Asia-
Pacific countries from 2010 until 2017. India is one of the countries in which health expenditure 
has grown more rapidly than income, leading to an increased share of health care expenditure from 
total expenditure (Appendix 9). However, within those 7 years there has not been any change in 
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health expenditure by the compulsory insurance scheme as well as the government scheme, 
measured by the unchanged share of GDP slightly above 1% (Appendix 10). As mentioned before, 
the main funding source of India’s health expenditure is out-of-pocket, which also explains why 
there has not been any change in health expenditure funded by the government scheme and 
compulsory insurance scheme as a share of total health expenditure between 2010 and 2017. The 
country’s share of total health expenditure paid through both schemes remained constant with 
around 25% (Appendix 11). Another consequence of India’s financing schemes composition, in 
regard to health expenditure, is that less than 4% of government expenditure was allocated to health 
care within the same timeframe of seven years. In comparison to the OECD countries average of 
24.5%, India healthcare system clearly lags behind (Appendix 12 and 8). (OECD; World Health 
Organization 2020)  
 
7. Case Comparison and Outcome Analysis  
Both the Colombian and the Indian case of Novartis’ cancer drug Glivec differ significantly in 
terms of their outcome and corresponding BGRs. In order to conduct an in-depth analysis, it is vital 
to identify and understand the interests of stakeholders involved, especially of the respective 
governments and Novartis. Therefore, not only an overview of both country’s pharmaceutical 
markets from the corporate’s perspective was given, but also the framework conditions of both 
country’s health systems as well as health expenditure and funding, from the government’s 
perspective, were discussed. The following similarities and differences of both cases may help to 
understand and classify the IBGR between Novartis and both countries as well as to examine 
Novartis’ impact on the outcomes in both cases in the next step. These similarities and differences 
of both cases include their business environment and government’s framework conditions, the 
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pharmaceutical market, the health system, the health expenditure and funding of Colombia and 
India.  
In the case of Colombia vs. Novartis, a patent for Glivec has already been granted by Colombia’s 
government and approved by the Dirección Nacional de Derecho de Autor de Colombia (National 
Directorate of Copyright of Colombia) in 2012, while the India vs. Novartis case differs distinctly 
from the first one as the course of the patent application for Glivec in India in 2005 is the key 
component of the second case. Considering the negative outcome for Novartis in the Indian case, 
namely the final patent rejection of Glivec ruled by the country’s Supreme Court in 2013, a 
question can be raised whether the Colombian government followed the Gleevec case in India and 
whether the outcome of the Indian case had an impact on the Colombian government's request 
regarding the price reduction of Novartis' Gleevec drug. However, the answer to this question 
cannot be concluded given the available sources, thus it remains a possible assumption. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to compare both cases, as the business and government framework 
conditions of Columbia and India within the pharmaceutical sector share several similarities. From 
a corporate perspective, the pharmaceutical markets of both countries hold great potential and 
represent attractive markets for FDI within the pharma industry. Reasons for that are the growth 
potential of both pharmaceutical markets indicated by forecasts, the development of Colombia 
towards becoming an export hub for pharmaceutical products as well as India’s position within the 
global pharmaceutical market, also with respect to being the world’s largest provider of generics. 
Besides that, India’s Pharma Vision 2020 along with its described growth factors, FDI policies and 
already existing strong network of pharmaceutical manufactures as well as medical manufacturing 
facilities, have contributed to the constant growth of FDIs in the county’s pharmaceutical market. 
In comparison to India, Colombia’s pharmaceutical market is driven by its strong clinical research 
environment, the CAGR in its three segments generics, OTC and in particular patented medicines, 
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as well as its institutional environment, mainly dominated by the international reference entity 
INVIMA and the capital’s agenda towards progressive pharmaceuticals and health services. 
Corruption within the pharmaceutical industry is one of the potential risks in both countries which 
companies like Novartis should be aware of when doing business in emerging markets. Although, 
both Colombia (96th) and India (80th) rank relatively low on the Corruption Perceptions Index, 
only Colombia participates in the framework development and implementation of the GMM 
programme.  
In regard to the government’s framework conditions, the health systems as well as health 
expenditure and funding of both countries have a crucial impact on the regulations of respective 
pharmaceutical markets and their overall conditions. Additionally, the structure of the healthcare 
system shapes political decisions of various government officials in relation to the country’s 
pharmaceutical sector. The healthcare systems of both countries differ considerable as Colombia’s 
has a compulsory health insurance, the SGSSS, which covers almost the whole population by 
accounting for 97.6%, whereas India’s health system consists of public and private healthcare 
service providers, nonetheless it has the largest share of out-of-pocket health care payments in 2017 
and is about four times higher than Colombia’s out-of-pocket share. However, recent initiatives of 
different government delegates in India such as the PM-JAY and PMBJP have resulted in an 
increase of the government’s healthcare budget. Considering the following health expenditure and 
funding indicators: Health expenditure per capita, health expenditure as share of GDP, health 
expenditure from public sources as share of total health expenditure and change in health 
expenditure by government and compulsory insurance scheme as a share of total government 
expenditure, one can conclude that the overall health expenditure in Colombia and India is 
considerably low compared to the OECD country average. By taking into account the funding of 
health expenditure through public sources and its development, India lags certainly far behind 
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while Colombia almost reaches the OECD countries average. Colombia also ranks slightly above 
India in terms of the overall health expenditure indicators. The fact that India belongs to the worst 
performers amongst 44 countries highlights the government’s limited leeway for its health budget 
and funding sources as well as its dependency on low-cost medicines and the generics’ market 
importance. In both countries, health expenditure has grown more rapidly than income which 
implies another health budget limitation for the Columbian and Indian government. Given the 
comparison of various indicators, from the corporate and government perspective, the progressions 
and outcomes of both cases demonstrate the utmost complexity of IBGR and their significance in 
emerging markets as Columbia's and India's indicators differ to some extent strongly from those of 
the developed markets, in most cases. 
Furthermore, the Colombia vs. Novartis case is a good illustration of the political dimensions that 
price negotiations can bring, such as the involvement of Colombian diplomats in Washington who 
have also put political pressure on the Colombian government. Novartis’ reasoning of only using 
Compulsory Licensing in exceptional circumstances is not accurate as it’s not consistent with the 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement which Colombia, India and Switzerland has signed. According 
to the WTO, the Doha Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS clarifies the agreement’s flexibilities 
within the pharmaceutical sector. Apart from that, countries “are free to determine the grounds for 
granting compulsory licenses and to determine what constitutes a national emergency” (Meyer and 
Peng 2016). Colombia’s significant low health expenditure per capita in comparison to the 
treatment cost of Glivec which used to amount $15,000 a year, about twice as much as the average 
Colombian worker’s income, advocate the government’s motives in declaring Glivec as a matter 
of public interest (Gabble and Kohler 2014). Similar circumstances apply for the India vs. Novartis 
case, in which the monthly treatment cost of Glivec were almost 15 times higher than the monthly 
treatment cost of its generic competitors while 40% of India’s population earned less than $1.25 a 
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day at that time (Gabble and Kohler 2014). Therefore, it can be concluded that the driving reasons 
for the governments' actions of both countries are quite consistent, although the outcomes differ 
substantially. 
7.1 Stakeholder Theory 
The stakeholder theory provides a framework “that can help examine the connections between 
various stakeholders and the organization” (Silverman 2016). The objective of the stakeholder 
theory is to identify the legitimate interests of groups or individuals who can affect the companies’ 
objectives and business operations through their activities (Bruns 2016). As the government 
perspectives and interest of both countries have already been identified in the previous section, the 
next step involves the corporate perspective. In order to examine the extent of Novartis’ impact on 
the outcomes in both cases and to provide some guidance for Novartis in regard to the company’s 
general approach with the Columbian and Indian government as well as its pricing approach, the 
stakeholder theory describes two key questions: What is the company’s purpose and what is the 
company’s responsibility towards its stakeholders to promote cooperation and avoid actions that 
could have a negative impact on the company’s objectives? These two questions could be adopted 
by Novartis as a framework to positively shape the outcomes of BGRs in the future. Moreover, 
economic and social value can be added when corporations as Novartis and stakeholders as the 
Colombian and Indian government come together voluntarily to collaborate and ensure that 
respective interests are met. (World Health Organization 2019) The political stakeholder theory 
emphasizes the importance of a proactive approach, in which companies respond to any concerns 
addressing the MNE’ operations in the host country (Novartis Annual Report 2020). Applying this 
to the Novartis’ Glivec cases, it seems that Novartis has not proactively addressed the interests and 
concerns of both governments which is why there is room for improvement, from the corporate 
perspective. 
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7.2 Implications for negotiations 
Negotiations represent a central component of any IBGR and also play a major role in the Colombia 
vs. Novartis case, in particular price negotiations which have not been successful, thus contributing 
to the outcome of the case. Regarding the India vs. Novartis case, proactive negotiations could 
have possibly influenced the outcome in a positive way for both the corporation and the 
government since negotiations do have the potential to create economic and social value, similar 
to the stakeholder theory. Business-government bargaining is one of the pillars of the institution-
based view, which describes and analysis the interactions between corporations and the 
institutional environment and considers these as the result of a company’s business strategy in 
emerging markets. Accordingly, Novartis has an impact on the outcome of the IBGR with respect 
to Colombia and India and should align its respective business strategies for both emerging markets 
with the institutional environment, mainly related to price negotiations. Implications for Novartis 
in regard to its negotiation and IBGR approach, require taking into account the following 
negotiation principles. Firstly, understanding, accepting and capitalizing differences amongst 
negotiation partners is crucial and can contribute significantly to the outcome of the negotiation. 
As the pricing of Glivec remains the key underlaying issue in both cases, it is important for Novartis 
to understand its reason and background by applying the frameworks of the stakeholder theory and 
the institution-based view while considering the government’s perspective, including the health 
systems, health expenditure and funding of both countries respectively.  This also includes 
understanding and accepting the differences of emerging markets within the pharmaceutical 
industry. The next negotiation principle is about avoiding distributive bargaining if possible and 
instead identify opportunities for integrative bargaining, because so-called package deals allow 
more flexibility regarding the outcome and are more likely to create value due to potential trade-
offs and different interests of negotiating parties. However, the Columbia vs. Novartis case 
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represented a single-issue negotiation, in which only the price matters resulting in a relatively 
limited bargaining room for Novartis and the Columbian government. Lastly, the level of 
information can fundamentally determine the outcome of a negotiation and points out that it is in 




This case study clarifies that the relationship between Novartis and the Columbian as well as Indian 
government had an impact on the results of both cases. The fundamental factor contributing to both 
outcomes is the company's approach with regard to its business strategy and implementation, more 
specifically its pricing and negotiation methodology. Thereby, it seems that Novartis has 
completely neglected the essential differentiation criteria of a developed market compared to an 
emerging market, related to the pharmaceutical industry, and rather demonstrates a reactive or 
partly even passive stakeholder management approach. Given the major discontinuities and 
challenges of the global pharmaceutical industry, it is crucial for Novartis to realign its business 
strategy with the institutional environment and with the factors that influence the pharmaceutical 
industry, including the health system, health expenditure and funding within emerging markets. 
The large number of different institutional stakeholders involved in both cases indicates the impact 
and extent of BGRs within the pharmaceutical industry. Furthermore, both cases have illustrated 
that the impact of BGRs along with the results can be deal making or deal braking. As this paper 
focuses on stakeholder management and conduct of negotiations in correspondence with business-
government relationships, the underlying issue of pricing in both cases is not further discussed. 
Therefore, future primary research about pharmaceutical companies’ pricing methods in various 
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Appendix 1 – Novartis net sales by region  
 
 






Appendix 2 – Health expenditure per capita in 2018 
 
 
























Appendix 5 – Health expenditure from public sources as share of total  
 
 

















Appendix 7 – Change in health expenditure by government scheme and compulsory insurance 









Appendix 8 – Change in health expenditure by government and compulsory scheme as a share of 
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Appendix 10 – Change in health expenditure by government scheme and compulsory insurance 
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Appendix 11 – Change in health expenditure by government scheme and compulsory insurance 
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Appendix 12 – Change in health expenditure by government and compulsory health insurance 
schemes as a share of total government expenditure 
 
 
Source: OECD; World Health Organization. 2020. Health at a Glance: Asia/Pacific 2020: Measuring Progress 
Towards Universal Health Coverage. OECD Publishing, Paris. https://doi.org/10.1787/26b007cd-en. 
 
